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Section 1557: A Tragedy of Discrimination in Five Parts
Prologue: Rulemaking and Court Battles
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 was a massive undertaking to
create a “uniform national program for health insurance regulation in the United States.”2 The
main attributes of the ACA include changing the underwritten policies of insurers, creating more
competition in the health insurance industry, and offering health insurance protections for
consumers.3 The ACA passed in 2010 with mixed reviews.4 Some viewed the ACA as a
significant step forward for all Americans to have affordable health care.5 Other individuals,
organizations, and states saw the ACA as a constitutional abomination to vanquish for reasons
including the belief the law impeded on their right to choose not to purchase health insurance6 or
hindrances on the practice of religious freedoms.7 Hundreds of challenges to the ACA have
arisen since 2010, including challenges to “contradictory language” in the statute or to provisions
such as required contraception coverage on religious grounds.8 The law has withstood the attack,

1

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C § 18001 et seq. (2018).
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques
and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. H EALTH L. & POL’Y 27, 27 (2011).
3 Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 2, at ___.
4 See Eric Carstens, Losing Our Religion: How the HHS Contraceptive Mandate Unconstitutionally Burdens
Catholic Organization’s Free Exercise Rights, 20 TRINITY L. REV. 1 (2014) (examining the effects on Catholic
organizations as the ACA acts as an impedance on the rights of those organizations); see Arthur Nussbaum, M.D.,
Can Congress Make You Buy Health Insurance? The Affordable Care Act, National Health Care Reform, a nd the
Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate. 20 DUQ. L. REV. 411 (2012) (discussing the individual mandate); see
Richard A. Epstein, Bleak Prospects: How Health Care Reform Has Failed in the United States, 15 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 1 (2010) (arguing that the ACA is unsustainable and will ultimately fail); see Ezekiel J. Emanual M.D., Name
the Much-Criticized Federal Program that has Saved the U.S. $2.3 Trillion. Hint: It Starts with Affordable, STAT
(Mar. 22,2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/03/22/affordable-care-act-controls-costs/.; see James Hamblin,
M.D., The Precarious Success of Obamacare, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 16, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/03/for-those-that-hate-obamacare-do-you-know-why/387913/.
5 See e.g., Renée M. Landers, “Tomorrow” May Finally Have Arrived—The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act: A Necessary First Step Toward Health Care Equity in the United States, 6 J. H EALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 65
(2010) (discussing how while the ACA is imperfect, the ACA is step forward for American healthcare reform).
6 Most notably, challenges from “twenty-six states, several individuals, and the National Federation of Independent
Business brought suit in Federal District Court to challenge several provisions of the ACA including the individual
mandate—which imposes a penalty on those who do have health insurance coverage —and the expansion of
Medicaid by threatening to withdraw Medicaid funding to states if they did not increase maximum amount earned
above the federal poverty level. See generally Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
7 See Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 514-30 (2020)
(discussing the hundreds of lawsuits that have tried to invalidate the ACA).
8 See Gluck, supra note 7, at ___.
2
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including an attack that resulted in the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the law 9 in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.10 Various persons and entities continue to
challenge the ACA, including one that could invalidate the statute because the tax for not
purchasing health insurance is now nothing, which the Northern District of Texas held
invalidates the entire ACA on constitutional grounds.11
One portion attacked is the anti-discrimination regulations in § 18116 of the ACA.12
Under this section, an individual “shall not…be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any health program or activity, any part of
which is receiving Federal financial assistance.”13 Section 1557 is the ACA’s anti-discrimination
provision, prohibiting discrimination in federally funded health programs, federally-administered
health programs, and ACA created programs like the marketplace exchanges. 14 An exchange is
“[a]nother term for the Health Insurance Marketplace, a service available in every state that helps
individuals, families, and small businesses shop for and enroll in affordable medical
insurance.”15 In determining which individuals the ACA’s anti-discrimination provision protects,
the ACA looks to which groups receive protection under16 (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, also

Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus, 567 U.S. at 588. The Court held the act to be “constitutional in part and
unconstitutional in part.” The Court held that individual mandate that requires persons who do no t obtain insurance
to pay a tax was constitutional under Congress’s power to tax. Id.
10 There were five different holdings in the National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. For a detailed
breakdown of those individual holdings see Alicia Ouellette, Health Reform and the Supreme Court: The ACA
Survives the Battle of the Broccoli and Fortifies Itself Against Future Fatal Attack , 16 ALB. L. REV. 87, 100 (20122013).
11 See Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (holding that counter to Sebelius that claims
were not likely to succeed, the individual mandate was a lawful exercise of the taxing power or the commerce
clause).
12 42 U.S.C.§ 18116.
13 42 U.S.C.§ 18116(a).
14 Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Reform, Race, and Equity, 55
H OW. L.J. 855, 870 (2012).
15 U.S. C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVICES, Exchange, H EALTHC ARE .GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/exchange, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
16 42 U.S.C.§ 18116(a).
9
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known as Title VI;17 (2) the Education Amendments of 1972, also known as Title IX, which is
the anti-discrimination provision based on sex in an education setting;18 (3) the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975;19 and (4) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.20 Rather than “creat[ing]
new bases of prohibited discrimination,” only those previously established would receive
protection under the ACA.21 However, when the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) enacted the final rules under the Obama administration, HHS interpreted the term “on the
basis of sex” to include both “termination of pregnancy” and “gender identity,” categories that
none of the anti-discrimination statutes listed above protect.22 There were those opposed to the
inclusion of new classes under § 1557 and wished to enjoin the regulation as the Plaintiffs in the
case Franciscan Alliance Inc. v. Burwell sought to do, including a Catholic health care system
and eight states, and individual providers.23
Opponents of the ACA and HHS’s regulations also opposed another provision,24
specifically a rule prohibiting denial or limitation of coverage “for specific health services
related to gender transition if” those denials or limits of coverage “result in discrimination
against a transgender individual.”25 This rule banned “categorical coverage exclusion or
limitation for all health services related to gender transition.”26 HHS justified this rule by

17

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2018) (prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin in any program or activity that receives Federal funds or other Federal assistance).
18 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018) (this is the antidiscrimination provision
based on sex in an education setting).
19 The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2018) (prohibits discrimination based on age in any
program or activity receiving Federal Financial assistance).
20 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability about any
program or activity receiving federal funding).
21 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 671 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
22 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 92.4.
23 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 670. The other Plaintiffs include the states of Texas, Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana, Arizona, Kentucky, and Mississippi. Id. at 670 n.3. The other organizations involved
in this case as plaintiffs were Specialty Physicians of Illinois LLC and Christian Medical & Dental Associations. Id.
at 670.
23 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 674.
24 See id. at 672.
25 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(5).
26 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b).
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reasoning that transition services, including surgery, were now the default standard of care for
medical professionals treating transgender persons.27 Opponents of this provision, such as
Franciscan Alliance, Inc., a network of faith-based hospitals, expressed concerns that the
regulation does include a minimum age requirement, meaning that insurers may have to cover
transition services for children.28 Providers feared this provision would require them to offer and
perform procedures they did not believe were in the best interest of any patient no matter their
age, taking control from the medical provider.29
Franciscan Alliance Inc.30 and other Plaintiffs31 sued to enjoin these rules from
enforcement. As the U.S. District Court noted, Franciscan Alliance “does not believe that
transition related-procedures are ever in the best interests of its patients and providing or
covering any transition-related service would violate their deeply held religious beliefs.” 32 The
medical plans of the hospital system and the other plaintiffs specifically excluded transition
services per “their beliefs.”33 The combined plaintiffs feared the loss of millions of dollars in
funding each year from the federal government for following their religious beliefs as not
adhering to these guidelines would result in the loss of those revenues.34 Together the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin 45 C.F.R. § 92.4;35 this injunction would stop protections for “gender identity”
and “termination of pregnancy.”36

27

81 Fed. Reg. at 31429.
Id.
29 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 672-73 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
30 According to their website this organization is “[a] trusted leader in prov iding faith-based, integrated healthcare”
that “has stayed true to [the organization’s] founding mission to care for everyone who comes through [its] doors.”
See FRANCISCANH EALTH, About Us, https://www.franciscanhealth.org/about-us, (last accessed Apr. 16, 2020).
31 The other Plaintiffs include the states of Texas, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana, Arizona, Kentucky, and
Mississippi. Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 670 n.3. The other organizations involved in this case as
plaintiffs were Specia lty Physicians of Illinois LLC and Christian Medical & Dental Associations. Id. at 670.
32 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 674.
33 Id. at 675.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
28
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HHS fought back, claiming entitlement to Chevron deference,37 which means the
addition of gender identity and abortion status were within the scope of HHS’s rulemaking
authority.38 HHS argued that because it is a rulemaking agency, HHS’s interpretation of the
meaning of “sex” under the statute should persist. 39 The court disagreed and held HHS lacked the
authority to extend this definition—even when considering Chevron deference—because
Congress did not provide HHS with the power to decide the scope and meaning of sex.40
Additionally, the court found that Congress had not intended a shift from the original
definition of sex in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018),
which refers to sex binary terms, using the language “both sexes” or “one sex” throughout the
section.41 The court reasoned that if Congress intended to expand the definition of sex under the
ACA, Congress would have included additional protections for gender identity within the final
text of the ACA.42 The court concluded that Congress did not intend the expansion of antidiscrimination protections to include gender identity as a protected class.43 Interpretations of
Title IX did not include gender identity at the time Congress passed Title IX.44 Therefore, the
ACA uses the term “sex” as defined when Title IX became law. 45 The court does not contend
with more recent judicial interpretations of Title IX, where protections based on sex within Title

37

Chevron deference describes the administrative law doctrine articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court held that a court reviewing an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute must defer to the federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous
statute. For a more detailed analysis of this topic see GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS and R OBERT L. GLICKSMAN, §
8:47, PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L., 2nd ed. 2020; see also Kent Barnett, et al., Administrative Law’s Political
Dynamics, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (2018).
38 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 685 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 687.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 688.
43 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 688 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
44 Id.
45 Id.
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IX include protections of transgender students. 46
The court also found the rule was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law” because it
did not include the religious protections expressly provided in the civil rights laws to which the
ACA refers.47 With the reasoning discussed above,48 the court enjoined the protections under 45
C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(4) that prohibited categorical exclusions or limitations for services related to
gender transition.49 This injunction remains in effect today, and HHS’s Office for Human Rights
cannot enforce these two provisions.50 A month after the court’s decision, the Trump
Administration transitioned into power, and HHS withdrew from its pending proceedings against
Franciscan Alliance Inc. and has not appealed the court’s decision or injunction.51
At this stage, an appeal is impossible because of the time elapsed since the court’s
judgment far exceeds the 30-day limit in Federal courts.52 Therefore, a new and suitable case
must arise to change the decision in Franciscan Alliance; however, any action from HHS is
highly unlikely under the Trump Administration, as the administration did not pursue an appeal
of Franciscan Alliance.53 The situation is dire for transgender persons looking to receive any
transition services because Franciscan Alliance still enjoins the final rule issued by HHS under
the Obama Administration. Section 1557 should bar a federally funded insurer’s refusal to cover
transition services via the other statutes to which § 1557 refers.54

46

Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that discrimination against
transgender students is sex discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause); Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t. of
Educ., 845 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that discrimination against transgender persons was likely sex
discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause).
47 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
48 The court also discusses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which is beyond the scope of this paper. See id.
at 691-93.
49 Id. at 696.
50 U.S. DEP’T . OF H EALTH & H UMAN SERVS., Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ,
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/index.html, (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
51 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Price, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5 (N.D. Tex., Jul. 10, 2017).
52 F.R. App. P. 4(1)(A).
53 See Price, 2017 WL 3616652, at *5.
54 42 U.S.C.§ 18116(a) (the statutes include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972).
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This paper argues that the regulations prohibiting (1) discrimination based on gender
identity and (2) the protection against denial of coverage for health services related to gender
transition must be reinstated as a matter of public health policy for equitable treatment of those
with different gender identities under the law. This paper proposes a two-tiered approach to
reinstitute these protections. First, transition services, including surgery, should be recognized as
medically necessary by all federally funded or subsidized insurers and as an essential benefit for
this population.55 Second, an expansion of the definition of sex under the ACA is critical to
provide transgender persons equal protection under the law. This goal is achievable statutorily or
through judicial interpretation to include more than cisgender persons—those whose gender
identity matches their biological sex.56
A continued reinterpretation of the definition of sex under Title IX would prevent
insurers from discriminating by refusing or specifically excluding coverage for medically
necessary transition treatments and services.57 Statutorily, amendments to any of the statutes—
such as Title IX—that the ACA looks to regarding which classes receive protection would also
suffice. Another possibility is reinterpretations of the definition of sex under Title VII, 58 which
applies to discrimination in the employment context, offer persuasive value. Finally, Congress
could simply amend the ACA to explicitly offer protections for transgender persons, as one of
the primary goals of the ACA still is consumer protection.59

55

While there is some controversy surrounding children using transition services including hormones and puberty
blockers, that discussion is for other authors and the author assumes that parental consent exists for the services.
This paper mostly focuses on how to counteract discrimination in the insura nce place and enable payment for the
services this population needs.
56 Johns Hopkins defines cisgender as “a term for people whose gender identity generally matches the gender
assigned for their physical sex. In other words, someone who does not identify a s transgender.” Linell Smith,
Glossary of Transgender Terms, JOHNS H OPKINS M ED., (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/articles/glossary-of-terms-1.
57 While the protections also included termination of pregnancy, such is not the focus of th is paper and is for
discussion by other authors.
58 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018).
59 Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 2.
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This paper has five parts to illustrate the complexities and solutions to various issues. Part
I describes the stories of individuals caught in a world where the denial of transition services has
devastating effects. Part II defines key terms, discusses the mental health challenges experienced
by many transgender persons, and analyzes the term gender dysphoria. Part III supplies an
analysis of the term medical necessity, examines standard contractual language, and offers a
review of current benchmark marketplace plans. Part IV analyzes the current state of Medicaid
as it relates to transgender health care and shows why such protections under the ACA are
necessary. Part V argues for reforms essential to make protections for transgender persons and
coverage for transition services a reality for many transgender persons around the country.
Part I: A Case Study
The discrimination and disparate impacts caused by the denial of transition services has a
human cost. This section outlines multiple stories that show the effects of existing insurance
practices on a transgender person. While this section focuses on the story of one person, Jasmine,
this is not an uncommon problem.60
There are troubling stories of the inability to pay for medically necessary procedures for
transgender persons. Jasmine Glenn is a transgender woman who would call friends while
sobbing and threatening to kill herself with the knife she gripped in her hand.61 To combat the
desire to self-harm and to attempt to conform to what society believed she should be, a man, she
would do “crazy” things.62 Jasmine would drink, race her car, and even jump through bonfires to
prove her masculinity to a world that did not understand who Jasmine was.63 Jasmine’s

60

See generally Emanuella Grinberg, et al., To be herself, she needs to change her body. But first, comes the battle
with insurers, CNN, (May 31, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/31/health/transgender-surgeryinsurance/index.html.
61 Grinberg, supra note 60.
62 Grinberg, supra note 60.
63 Grinberg, supra note 60.
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alcoholism also led to multiple drunk driving arrests; she was drinking to the point of blackout.64
Jasmine changed in her thirties. She could accept herself as Jasmine; she could live as a
woman but needed to transition.65 Like other transgender persons, Jasmine always had to prove
her gender to “meet the criteria set by physicians, insurance companies, and lawmakers.” 66 The
“countless hours” spent on the phone with her insurance company or researching information
and cases to support her push for medically necessary treatments became an all-consuming
battle.67
Resilient, Jasmine began to pay for her hormones in 2012—out-of-pocket—because she
lacked insurance to cover the necessary therapies to transition and become her true self.68
Jasmine eventually obtained insurance coverage via Medicaid in Michigan.69 Yet, securing
insurance began what seems like an eternal struggle—the perpetual battle to receive treatment.70
Once she had obtained a pre-authorization—an insurance term for preapproval—for
vaginoplasty through appeal, she had not yet received authorization for the hair removal required
as a prerequisite.71 By the time she had started the hair removal treatments, the pre-authorization
for the vaginoplasty had expired.72 When she tried again, the insurer completely denied her
claim.73 The insurer told her the surgery was—as a strict prohibition—no longer covered.74
Jasmine continued her battle against her insurance company and depression—a side-effect of her
gender dysphoria.75 Jasmine is not alone. The suffering that Jasmine faces is all too common.76
64

Grinberg, supra note 60.
Grinberg, supra note 60.
66 Grinberg, supra note 60.
67 Grinberg, supra note 60.
68 Grinberg, supra note 60.
69 Grinberg, supra note 60.
70 Grinberg, supra note 60.
71 Grinberg, supra note 60.
72 Grinberg, supra note 60.
73 Grinberg, supra note 60.
74 Grinberg, supra note 60.
75 Grinberg, supra note 60.
76 See Grinberg, supra note 60. This article includes multiple examples from other transgender persons about their
battle for insurance coverage of medically necessary services.
65
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While this paper chooses to focus on Jasmine’s story, others face the consequences of
trying to navigate current insurance practices. Derrick Robinson turned to alcohol and was only
finally able to obtain a bilateral mastectomy following receiving a letter from his psychologist.77
Autumn Trafficante was very careful in financially planning her transition, all the while battling
suicidal thoughts.78 Autumn’s insurance would deny her claims, forcing Autumn to take on extra
work, take a line of credit, and borrow from relatives to pay $70,000 for facial feminization
surgery.79
The problem spreads far beyond a limited choice of individuals. Sergeant Anna Lange of
Georgia decided to undergo gender transition a few years into her marriage. 80 Knowing that her
ex-wife would move into rural Houston County, she followed to be close to her son.81 While she
tried a different position, she went back to being a police officer in the county.82 Anna flew to
New York after her surgeon confirmed her county insurance plan would cover the procedures.83
Despite these assurances, she received notification that her insurer would not cover the procedure
required.84 Stories like Sargent Anna’s; stories like Jasmine's—they barely scratch the surface of
what is a systemic problem. The problem is partially to blame on semantics and classifications,
which the next section explores.
Part II: Definitions, Terms, & Mental Health
The harms that Jasmine and other transgender persons face when navigating the
complexities of health insurance require background on the persons and the situations they

77

Grinberg, supra note 60.
Grinberg, supra note 60.
79 Grinberg, supra note 60.
80 Keren Landman, Fresh Challenges to State Exclusions on Transgender Health Coverage , NPR, (Mar. 12, 2019 at
5:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/03/12/701510605/fresh-challenges-to-state-exclusionson-transgender-health-coverage.
81 Landman, supra note 80.
82 Landman, supra note 80.
83 Landman, supra note 80.
84 Landman, supra note 80.
78
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face—and why these services are critical.85 As such, this part contains two subsections. The first
subsection outlines some general terms and discusses why the meanings of some terms—most
notably the meaning of the word “sex” in a legal context—needs revision to one that embraces
gender identity as a central component. The second subsection highlights some of the possible
procedures and services that transgender persons may need while transitioning with a spotlight
on how mental health is always a consideration in that process. The second subsection also offers
a brief examination of the complex issue of gender dysphoria and its necessity as a diagnosis.
Defining gender dysphoria as a mental disorder is controversial;86 however, this paper does not
take a stance about that controversy.
1. Terms Regarding the Person
A review of the terminology used by transgender persons is necessary to understand why
transition services are medically essential to preventing harm, such as those experienced by
Jasmine. The term transgender refers to individuals “whose gender does not match their
biological sex at birth.”87 Gender non-conforming behaviors are those that clash with society’s
expectation that one must fall into one of two gender roles.88 Gender non-conforming and
transgender are not the same. A person who is gender non-conforming may not be a transgender
person, and any transgender person may not be gender non-conforming.89 By contrast, cisgender
persons possess both reproductive organs and the social gender assigned at birth.90
The definition of sex is fluid and changes with context. For example, HHS’s proposed

85

See Kellan Baker & Andrew Cray, Why Gender-Identity Nondiscrimination in Insurance Makes Sense, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, (May 2, 2013), http:// cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/BakerNon
discriminationInsurance-6.pdf.
86 See generally Walter Bockting, Are Gender Identity Disorders Mental Disorders, Recommendations for Revision
of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care , 11 I NT. J. of TRANSGENDERISM
53, 53-62 (2009).
87 KIMBERLY TAUCHES, Transgender, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY, 844, 844 (2009).
88 GLAAD Media Reference Guide – Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender, (last
visited Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter GLAAD].
89 GLAAD, supra note 88.
90 B. Aultman, Cisgender, 1 TRANSGENDER STUDIES QUARTERLY, 61-62, 61 (2014)
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rule dated May 24, 2019, states that “HHS would apply Congress’s words using their plain
meaning when [written], instead of attempting to redefine sex discrimination.”91 The opinion in
Franciscan Alliance states that “the term ‘sex’ was commonly understood to refer to the
biological differences between males and females.” 92 The court also states that Congress
intended the definition of sex to refer to the two sexes as the original language from the statute
refers to “students of one sex” or “both sexes,”93 suggesting a dichotomy that would eliminate
the possibility of other gender identities.94 Sex under this definition is a constant and unyielding
scientific fact—one that is inconsistent with the experiences of many persons. This rigid
definition is a form of biologism, the belief that what distinguishes humans are biological
factors.95 In biologism, these biological factors are “both deterministic to and the essence of
specific human phenomena,” including both gender and sex.96
Other definitions refer to sex as “the classification of a person as male or female. At birth,
infants are assigned a sex, usually based on the appearance of their external anatomy.” 97 This
definition is more flexible. While our genetic evidence may classify persons into one gender, that
does not mean that the category is immutable. Human experience is ever-changing. Some courts
have moved to a more contemporary understandings of human experience. These courts have
found that “transgender status and gender identity are “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing

U.S. DEP’T. OF H EALTH & H UMAN SERVS. – OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, Fact Sheet: HHS Proposes to Revise ACA
Section 1557 Rule, HHS.GOV 3 (May 24, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/factsheet-section-1557.pdf.
92 Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 688 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
93 Counter to the Congressional intent advocated here, the simple existence of persons born intersex —individuals
who are not considered by medical experts as “normal” males or females—suggests such definitions of sex that
create a dichotomy of merely male and female are complicated, and may also eliminate protections for intersex
individuals under any anti-discrimination provision, such as Title VII. See generally Illana Gelfmann, Because of
Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality of Discrimination “Because of…[Perceived] Sex”, 34 N.Y.U.
REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 55 (2010).
94 Franciscan Alliance, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 687.
95 Sari M. Van Anders, Bio/logics, 1 Transgender Studies Quarterly 33, 33-34 (2014).
96 An also interesting note here is that biologism may also include the belief that other human experiences are
predeterminate including race and socioeconomic status. Anders, supra note 96 at 33.
97 GLAAD, supra note 88.
91

13

Section 1557: A Tragedy of Discrimination in Five Parts
characteristic[s]” and “transgender people are unarguably a politically vulnerable minority.”98
The problem with rigid definitions is that they are strict and unyielding. Whether that is
intentional or not, rigid definitions create difficulty in seeing any other possibility. The goal is to
overcome the tendency to limit sex to its biologic definition by offering transgender persons the
same benefits as cisgender persons. These protections include those statutes where sex is a
protected class, including the ACA.
2. Mental Health, Gender Dysphoria, and the Necessity of Transition
Transgender persons of all ages face similar adverse effects on physical and mental
health. For transgender persons, the consequences of lack of access to such services generate
continuous and unyielding harm. Transgender persons of any age may encounter social rejection
by peers or family, verbal or physical abuse, increased stress, and educational difficulties. 99 A
2007 study that relied on reports from fifty-five transgender youth regarding their lifethreatening behaviors—such as suicide attempts and suicidal thoughts—73% faced at least
verbal abuse by their parents.100 Among these difficulties, another study found that 45% of
transgender youth had thought of killing themselves; half of those persons said that it was related
to transgender identity.101 Other mental health concerns among transgender youth include
anxiety, substance abuse, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression. 102
Mental health concerns are similar for adults, including the possibility of suicide ideation
and self-harm.103 Studies have found that between 50 to 80% of transgender persons have
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F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145 (D. Idaho 2018) (citing Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104
(N.D. Cal. 2015)).
99 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N TASK FORCE ON GENDER I DENTITY AND GENDER VARIANCE 10 (2009),
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/gender-identity-report.pdf.
100 Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth and Life-Threatening Behaviors, 37 SUICIDE
& LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 527, 528 (2007).
101 SUICIDE PREVENTION R ESOURCE C TR., SUICIDE R ISK AND PREVENTION FOR LESBIAN, B ISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER YOUTH 27 (Effie Malley et al. eds., 2008).
102 Johanna Olson, Management of the Transgender Adolescent, ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLSEC. M ED. 165 (2011).
103 ERIC YARBROUGH, TRANSGENDER M ENTAL H EALTH 11 (2018).
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experienced verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, harassment, discrimination, violence, or forced
sex.104
Doctors may label a transgender person with a mental disorder defined in standard
medical texts. The central “medical diagnosis,” enabling access to healthcare services and
programs—when these services are available—is gender dysphoria. The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) states that gender dysphoria “involves a
difference between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, and significant
distress or problems functioning” as a result of that difference.105 These circumstances must last
at least six months, and the patient must show at least two of the following:
1. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary
and/or secondary sex characteristics
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other
gender
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other
gender.”106
There are separate requirements for child diagnosis of gender dysphoria. 107 However, the
outcomes are similar. The American Psychiatric Association notes that “diagnostic terms
facilitate care and access to insurance coverage that supports mental health; these terms can also
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LAURA ERICKSON-SCHROTH, TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY
310 (Laura Srickson-Schroth ed. 2014).
105 Ranna Parekh, M.D., M.P.H., What is Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N.,
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria , (last visited Apr. 17,
2020).
106 Parekh, supra note 105.
107 Six of the following must be present for at least six months and must also have “an associate d significant distress
or impairment injunction.” The factors are: (1) A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence that one is
the other gender; (2) A strong preference for wearing clothes typical of the opposite gender; (3) A strong prefere nce
for cross-gender roles in make-believe play or fantasy play; (4) A strong preference for the toys, games or activities
stereotypically used or engaged in by the other gender; (5) A strong preference for playmates of the other gender; (6)
A strong rejection of toys, games and activities typical of one’s assigned gender; (7) A strong dislike of one’s sexual
anatomy; and (8) A strong desire for the physical sex characteristics that match one’s experienced gender. Parekh,
supra note 105.
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have a stigmatizing effect.”108 This effect includes identification as being mentally ill or
pathological.109
Identification as mentally ill or pathological causes significant difficulties for transgender
persons. Several psychiatric diagnostic texts classify transgender persons as having mental
disorders, including the DSM-5 and the International Statistical Classification of Disorders
(ICD).110 This other attempt to identify transgender persons as mentally ill or inferior carries
with it numerous side-effects such as “stigmatization, discrimination, social exclusion, and
transphobic violence.”111 This misleading definition of gender identity suggests to some that
those with diverse sexual identities are somehow broken and require conversion therapy to
“correct their deviance.”112 A natural tension exists between these two sentiments.
The term transition is a process whereby a transgender person moves from living aligned
with the gender assigned at birth to that of their gender identity.113 There is a misnomer that this
process only centers around surgery; instead, it is a process each individual takes at their own
pace; not every step needs completion.114 Some may skip hormones or surgery but take other
steps to transition.115 Medical transition is but one possible stage in the process.116 A medical
transition may encompass treatments and services like hormones, surgery, and mental health
counseling.117 There are several significant surgical procedures that more closely align a person’s
inward and outward appearance.118 The physical process can begin for minors, but the

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Gender Dysphoria, (2013), https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/
Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf.
109 Amets Suess, Karine Espinera, and Pau Crego Walters, Depathologization, 1 Transgender Studies Quarterly 73,
73 (2014) [hereinafter Suess].
110 Suess, supra note 109.
111 Suess, supra note 109.
112 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 93.
113 Smith, supra note 56.
114 Smith, supra note 56.
115 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129.
116 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129.
117 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129.
118 Smith, supra note 56.
108
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complexities and ethical concerns of surgery or hormones as a child with or without parental
permission are not discussed in this paper. Other authors have thoroughly discussed those
issues.119 This paper assumes there is no question that the minor should have access to these
procedures, if that minor has parental consent and is about to begin their transition but encounter
bureaucratic roadblocks of insurance that are unethical and discriminatory. 120
Another potential step in the transition process is legal transition, which includes acts
such as a legal name change or a change of gender marker on identification.121 There is also a
significant social component to transition that should not go unnoted.122 The timetable for
transition can be a few months or span decades.123 This process is not an insignificant journey
within a person’s life; for many, the journey is beneficial. A person’s quality of life improves
when they have started the process of transitioning. 124
These situations combine the stigmatization of mental health, the concept that
“something” is wrong, and the difficulties that transgender persons face. Even a diagnosis does
not automatically guarantee the provision of services or coverage by one’s insurance company.
Persons can still be denied coverage because of a specific exclusion, a procedure not being
deemed a “medical necessity,” or for not being able to navigate a complicated appeals process—
all of these are described in the next section. Necessary to begin change and enable greater
access for transgender persons to transition services is to (1) provide that transition care, as a
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See Federica Vergain, Why Transgender Children Should Have the Right to Block Their Own Puberty With Court
Authorization, 13 FIU L. REV. 903 (2019); see also Emily Ikuta, Overcoming the Parental Veto: How Transgender
Adolescents Can Access Puberty-Suppressing Hormone Treatment in the Absence of Parental Consent Under the
Mature Minor Doctrine, 25 S. CAL. I NTERDISC. L.J. 179 (2016); see also Brendan S. Abel, Hormone Treatment of
Children and Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria: An Ethical Analysis,” LGBT BIOETHICS: VISIBILITY,
DISPARITIES, AND DIALOGUE , SPECIAL REPORT , 5 H ASTINGS CENTER REPORT 44 (2014); see also N. P. Spack,
Management of Transgenderism, 309 J. OF THE AM. M ED. ASS’N 478 (2013).
120 Anemona Hartocollis, The New Girl in School: Transgender Surgery at 18, N.Y. TIMES. (June 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/nyregion/transgender-minors-gender-reassignment-surgery.html.
121 Hartocollis, supra note 120.
122 Hartocollis, supra note 120.
123 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 129.
124 Yarbough, supra note 103 at 131.
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mental health service, is an essential health benefit; (2) sex should include those beyond those
who are cisgender; and (3) Franciscan Alliance should be overturned, and the original final rule
should persist through a reinterpretation of the definition of sex. Those changes would prevent
insurers from being able to specifically exclude or refuse to offer treatments medically necessary
for persons to live as they see themselves.
Part III: Insurance and Medical Necessity
There is a constant battle between those in health care seeking profit, such as insurers,
and patients.125 Health insurance is big business; the industry realized net earnings of $23.4
billion in 2018, which was a substantial increase from $16.1 billion in 2017.126 The insurers face
a tremendous amount of growth and have an interest in accumulating profit. By contrast,
patients, including those in transition, are concerned about themselves and their health needs.
Still, the insurer is unwilling to provide such care or may make it difficult for the seeker of
coverage127 to do so by overburdening them with a complicated appeals process.
This section addresses that tense relationship in three separate subsections. The first
subsection examines conceptions of “medical necessity,” why that seemingly harmless term
results in the denial of coverage for many individuals and demonstrates that health services
related to gender transition are “medically necessary“ under the ACA. The second subsection
looks at EHB-benchmark plans—state selected plans that must include coverage of specific
“essential benefits”128 —from two states (New Jersey and New York) to examine their effects on
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Peter Ubel, Is the Profit Motive Ruining American Healthcare?, FORBES, (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:32 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2014/02/12/is-the-profit-motive-ruining-americanhealthcare/#d8b891837b97.
126 NAT ’L ASS’N OF I NS. C OMM ’RS, U.S. Health Insurance Industry – 2018 Annual Results,
https://naic.org/documents/topic_insurance_industry_snapshots_2018_health_ins_ind_report.pdf, (last visited Apr.
26, 2020) (as of Apr. 26, 2020 the 2019 report is unavailable).
127 See Grinberg, supra note 60. Sometimes the inclusions are blanket inclusions. Other times the policies are
unclear or may say they offer services for gender reassignment, only to include other recommended treatments or
services. Grinberg, supra note 60.
128 45 C.F.R. § 156.111(b).
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transgender individuals. An essential health benefit is “a set of 10 categories of services health
insurance plans must cover under the Affordable Care Act.” 129 The ten categories include but are
not limited to mental health and substance use disorder services as well as prescription drugs. 130
The third subsection examines the regulatory path for transition procedures and services to
become an EHB. The final section explores the insurance appeals process, analyzing that process
and why the process is not an adequate substitute for covering transition services when
recommended by an individual’s doctor and consented to by an informed patient.
1. Medical Necessity
Medical necessity is a flexible definition that can either result in denial or approval of
coverage for treatments outside a set coverage area.131 The insurer decides whether a service is
medically necessary and should be a covered benefit for the person asking for its coverage.132
The doctor does not make the decision. The patient or the patient’s parent does not make the
decision. The insurance company makes a choice. There is a natural tension between what the
patient and doctor may both believe is the right course of treatment and the insurer’s goals. That
decision to not cover preferred care by the insurer may reduce financial costs.133 Still, other
economic considerations require examination as well, such as the cost to the individual denied
coverage.
In the 1990s, a team at Stanford University developed a model contractual language for
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U.S. C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., Essential Health Benefits, H EALTHCARE.GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/ glossary/essential-health-benefits, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
130 U.S. C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., What Marketplace health insurance plans cover,
H EALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/ glossary/what-marketplace-plans-cover, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
131 I NST . OF M ED., ESSENTIAL H EALTH B ENEFITS: B ALANCING C OVERAGE AND C OST 28 (2012) [hereinafter EHB].
132 EHB, supra note 131.
133 Actuaries, as the insurance industries determiner of what procedures costs, typically overestimate the cost
associated with gender reassignment surgery. The primary paradigm accepted by the industry is that all transgender
persons want gender reassignment surgery, which would be a significant financial cost. The opposite is true. Many
transgender persons avoid such surgeries for a variety of personal reasons, including risk aversion. See J. Denise
Diskin, Taking to the Bank Actualizing Health Care Equality for San Francisco’s Transgender City and County
Employees, 5 Hastings Race and Poverty L.J. 129 (2008).
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medical necessity.134 The result of this team was what became known as the “Stanford Model
Contractual Language for Medical Necessity” for health insurance contracts. 135 This model is by
far the one most encountered during research. The language states:
“For contractual purposes, an intervention will be covered if it is an otherwise category of
service, not specifically excluded, and medically necessary. An intervention may be
medically indicated yet not be a covered benefit or meet this contractual definition of
medical necessity. A health plan may choose to cover interventions that do not meet this
contractual definition of medical necessity.”136
A few ideas are central to this language. First, insurance always reserves the ability to cover any
or no interventions. The insurer is the one with the ultimate decision-making power—not the
patient and not the doctor. Second, any intervention receives coverage if not specifically
excluded and medically necessary. There are some problems with this second point. These
treatments and services are generally either specifically excluded or defined as not medically
necessary. Clauses like these enable insurance companies to create a “Get Out of Covering Card”
to avoid paying for services.
The American Medical Association's definition is more acceptable but still not perfect.
Medical necessity, according to the American Medical Association, is:
“Health care services or products that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for
the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease or its
symptoms in a manner that is (a) in accordance with generally accepted standards of
medical practice; (b) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and
duration, and (c) not primarily for the economic benefit of the health plans and
purchasers or for the convenience for the patient, treating physician, or other health care
provider.”137

I NST. OF M ED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL H EALTH BENEFITS WORKSHOP REPORT:
STANFORD M ODEL CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE FOR M EDICAL NECESSITY, 163-64, 2012 [hereinafter Stanford
Model].
135 Stanford Model, supra note 134.
136 Stanford Model, supra note 134 at 228. Other languages drop the specifically excluded language of the Stanford
Model. However, some of these have other language useable to exclude such as “not primarily for the convenience
of the patient, physician or health care provider.” There is no elaboration of that language. Such language may
prevent the use of, for example, puberty blockers for children who seek to delay puberty prior to seeking hormone
therapies. The language could also exclude services such physical therapy in favor of invasive procedures, but that is
beyond the scope of this paper.
137 Stanford Model, supra note 134 at 228.
134
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While the languages sound similar, there are several clear distinctions. First is the final
distinction under (c). This language shows that—contrary to the Stanford Model—that the
insurer is not the primary decision maker. This language is more patient centric as it removes the
economic incentive from the insurer’s pocket and gives control of medical decisions back to
patients and providers. Second, there is no language in this definition of “specifically excluded”
procedures. This distinction is vital because it opens the possibility of payment for all medical
purposes. The primary issue, however, is in the “illness, injury, disease, or its symptoms”
language. Such a problem may be the result of pure semantics, but persons of different gender
identities do not suffer from any of those listed. Those individuals merely wish for the ability to
align their true self with their physical person. However, many have argued that transition
therapies and services can cure or treat depression and anxiety. 138
2. ACA EHB-Benchmarks Plans
Balancing the goal of the ACA and the reality of affordability is a constant struggle. The
purpose of the ACA was to provide access to health insurance coverage, including through
marketplace plans.139 The secondary goal is to keep costs low so that such coverage will remain
affordable.140 Developing a marketplace plan is a two-step process.141 The first step is an
examination of what “ a typical employer plan” consists of and using that plan as a baseline.
Second, is the inclusion of the 10 categories of essential benefits into that plan, cutting and
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While plausible for hormone therapy to be a treatment for depression or anxiety, our society is not yet able to
view non-cissexuals (including those who are pansexual and asexual) as “normal people.” Mental health care in this
health care system in general is haphazard—but it is better than nothing. Thus, a tension exists between a label that
should not exist and living in an “antiquated” society. See Alice Dreger, Why Gender Dysphoria Should No Longer
be Considered a Medical Disorder, PacificStandard, (June14, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/take-genderidentity-disorder-dsm-68308.
139 EHB, supra note 131 at 1.
140 EHB, supra note 131 at 12. The highlights of accessibility include affordability, ease of access, and increases in
spending. There is an irony that some plans make it difficult for transgender persons to receive services based on
affordability and ease of access. Even if insurers will approve an unlisted procedure, this approval is behind t he veil
of a vague approval and then appeal process.
141 EHB, supra note 131 at 1.
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trimming non-essential coverages as necessary to reach cost targets. 142 Marketplace plans arise
through bridging “a typical employer plan” and ten special enumerated categories of essential
benefits which all plans must-have.143 Each state also requires some benefits by the law of that
state.144
The New Jersey Benchmark Model Plan for 2020 adopts the baseline and model for what
procedures and treatments the policy will cover. Excluded are “surgery, sex hormones, and
related medical, psychological, and psychiatric services” for gender transition or complications
arising therefrom.145 The model plan also only covers prescriptions for three reasons and, as
such, would determine whether hormone treatments or other transition therapies would be
covered for transgender persons. First is if the drug is “approved for the treatment of the Covered
Person’s illness or injury by the Food and Drug Administration.”146 Next is if the Food and Drug
Administration has approved it for treatment elsewhere and if one or two compendia lists the
drug.147 Third, the drug requires recommendation by a clinical study or recommendation in a
significant peer-reviewed professional journal.148
In contrast, New York’s benchmark plan does not explicitly exclude transition services
but instead does not cover any services not listed as covered in the plan. 149 Any services
regarding transition for youth or adults are not listed in the covered procedures.150

142

EHB, supra note 131 at 1.
EHB, supra note 131 at 1.
144 U.S. C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVICES, Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark
Plans, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/reources/data-resources/ehb, (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
145 H ORIZON B LUE C ROSS B LUE SHIELD OF NEW JERSEY, Small Group Health Benefits Policy, 88
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data -Resources/Downloads/PA-BMP.zip, (last visited Apr. 24, 2020)
[hereinafter Horizon].
146 Horizon, supra note 145 at 66.
147 More specifically, The American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information or The United States
Pharmacopeia Drug Information. Horizon, supra note 145 at 66-67.
148 Horizon, supra note 145 at 67.
149 OXFORD H EALTH I NS. I NC., Certificate of Coverage, 61, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data Resources/Downloads/NY-BMP.zip, (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
150 See OXFORD H EALTH I NS. I NC., supra note 149.
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3. Essential Health Benefits and Section 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C) – “Other Groups”
Including transition services as a subset of Essential Health Benefits (EHB), under the
“other groups” definition of § 18022(b)(4)(C) would ensure plans include transition services.
EHBs151 cover a wide range of medical services and procedures taken and developed with a
framework that leads to potentially discriminatory results. To create the list of EHBs, HHS
compares standard small employer plans and then issues state requirements for essential covered
services to meet a targeted premium.152
The language in § 18022(b)(4) defines how a service becomes an EHB and implies a
method for transition services to achieve EHB status. Under § 18022(b)(4) are the elements
regarding consideration for which practices and procedures become EHBs covered by a
benchmark plan.153 The secretary of HHS must balance each of the factors so that none
substantially outweighs another.154 There can be no discrimination because of age, disability, or
expected length of life.155 The plans also cannot deny individuals the rights to EHBs as a result
of their age, life expectancy, disability, or medical dependency.156 EHBs must “take into account
the health care needs of diverse segments of the population, including women, children, persons
with disabilities, and other groups.”157 Notably, the phrase “and other groups” is unclear. This
phrase could apply to any significant subgroup within the United States—transgender persons in
general. Therefore, one method to provide safeguards for those looking to transition is to make
transition services considered an EHB—these services are critical to an “other group” within the
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U.S. C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., Essential Health Benefits, http://www.healthcare.gov/
glossary/essential-health-benefits, (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).
152 EHB, supra note 131.
153 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4); There are those insurance companies who specifically exclude such procedures because
they are not part of a state’s EHB There is no incentive for such procedures when there is no one or no rule to stop
this discriminatory practice. See Grinberg, supra note 60.
154 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(A).
155 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(B).
156 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(D).
157 42 U.S.C.§ 18022(b)(4)(C) (emphasis added).
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“diverse segments” of the population. Allowing the provision of such services through insurance
enables persons to become their true self.
4. A Lack of (Effective) Appeal
The limitations of contractual language are significant and often protect insurers. There is
an argument that insurers offer patients an “escape valve” of sorts through the appeals process.
To explore this process, a detailed description of a complete procedure is below. The first
procedural step is to file a prior authorization claim with your insurance company.158 The
company should return judgment upon the request in writing within 15 days.159
A filing of an appeal must now occur. This internal appeal requires (1) completion of all
the forms required by the insurer or a letter with proper identifying information; and (2) any
additional information such as a letter from a doctor.160 The appeal must be filed within 180 days
of the receipt of rejection but can then require an external appeal.161 The insurance company then
has another 30 days to approve or reject paying for the requested care.162 There does not appear
to be an incentive for the insurance company to expedite this process for non-emergency care.
The external review becomes possible after the denial of the internal review, which could
be as many as 225 days after the first request. The written request for external review must be
filed within 120 days of the denial via internal review. 163 Some states have their own appeals
process, of which there is up to a $25.00 fee to file the appeal. 164 The only possible objection
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U.S. C TRS. FOR M EDICARE & M EDICAID SERVS., Internal Appeals, H EALTHCARE.GOV,
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164 External Review, supra note 163.

24

Section 1557: A Tragedy of Discrimination in Five Parts
raiseable in this circumstance is “[a]ny denial that involves medical judgment where you or your
provider may disagree with the health insurance plan.” 165 As such, the review process may end
here for the majority of those seeking transition services.
The Stanford Model Contractual Language and similar models put the dead -end here in
the appeals process. The process limits the options of the patient when an insurer considers a
procedure or service not medically necessary. If the patient can navigate the complicated
process, any specifically excluded claim is not eligible for the appeals process. The insurance
company also has no incentive in approving any procedure that they do not consider medically
necessary. Most persons would surrender upon discovering the time required for this drawn-out
process and, for low-income individuals, the possibility of having to pay to file. Therefore, the
appeals process is ineffective for those seeking transition via insurance coverage for required
services.
The most practical solution to guarantee coverage of such services to transgender
individuals is to side-step these contractual and bureaucratic walls and other hurdles to treatment.
However, rather than offering a human-friendly solution to a well-established problem, the
current legal frameworks offer a mixed bag for those dependent on government protections.
Those protections initially offered are on perpetual hold, and even those who rely on government
assistance in the form of Medicaid have no options based on one thing: where they live.
Part IV: Medicaid
Just like private insurers, not all is perfect within government-funded and determined
health care programs. Medicaid is a joint federal and state-funded program administered by the
various states.166 States rules can vary. Some states do not offer coverage for transition services
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at all. While other states cover transition services, there are battles in states like Wisconsin and
Iowa over the coverage of such services. The needle is moving toward a more inclusive future.
1. States That Do Not Offer Medicaid Coverage
Medicaid is an essential provider of health care services to transgender persons because
transgender persons are more likely to depend on Medicaid coverage.167 A large number of states
either have no explicit policy concerning transgender health coverage or specifically exclude it in
their state employee benefit plans. Of the fifty states, ten explicitly exclude transgender care and
health care coverage from their state Medicaid plan. 168 Twelve states expressly prohibit
transition-related care coverage in their state employee health plan.169 Tennessee, for example,
includes “sex change or transformation” surgery specifically in its list of ninety-one stated
exclusions for coverage in its Medicaid program. 170 Despite these exclusions, there are battles in
some states to determine the constitutional legitimacy of such exclusions. One such state is
Wisconsin.
2. Battleground: Wisconsin - Flack
Wisconsin is a battleground where injunctions have foiled the state's pure ban on
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See CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL ., PAYING AN UNFAIR PRICE: THE FINANCIAL PENALTY FOR BEING
TRANSGENDER IN AMERICA, (2015). This publication supplies several reasons why transgender persons encounter
financial difficulties, which places these individuals in the lower income bracket required for Medicaid coverage.
Reasons provided include (1) employment discrimination forces transgender workers into lower paying jobs or
unemployment; (2) housing discrimination results in quoted higher prices or housing, which could lead to higher
expense or living in less desirable areas; (3) cost increases resulting from extended housing searches; (4) delayed
and thus more costly medical care as preventative care is delayed or av oided due to cost; (5) the costs of transition
related care, such as annual hormone or lab test costs; (6) borrowing money to pay for healthcare expenses; (6) loss
of productivity and employment because employment opportunities may not provide sick leave; (7) more expensive
lending due to employment difficulties and increased encounters to law enforcement can affect interest rates and
lead to unfair lending practices; (8) difficulty obtaining credit to support education expenses, business start -up
expenses, or other expenses such as housing; (9) higher costs associated with filing and processing fees for identity
documents; (10) refusal to supply identity documents to transgender persons; (11) lack of proper identification
prevents employment opportunities; (12) harmful school environments leading to dangerous situations and
decreased academic performance and graduation rates, leading to less employment opportunities; and (13) inability
to access financial aid for further educational opportunities.
168 M OVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT , Healthcare Laws and Policies, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/healthcare_laws_and_policies, (last visited April 26, 2020) [hereinafter MAP].
169 MAP, supra 168.
170 TENN. C OMP. R. & R EGS. 1200-13-13-.10 (2020).
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transgender services and surgery, most notably in Flack v. Wisconsin Department of Health
Services.171 Flack was decided in 2019 and held that the provisions of Wisconsin Medicaid for
both gender-conforming surgery and hormone therapies violated (1) the Affordable Care Act;172
(2) the Medicaid Act;173 and (3) the Equal Protection Clause.174
In this case, two transgender individuals with gender dysphoria challenged an exclusion
for medically prescribed gender-conforming surgery and related hormones under Wisconsin
Medicaid.175 The court found that the regulations originally were developed under the guise that
such procedures were costly.176 The Wisconsin Department of Health Services (WDHS) then
could not provide any evidence as to how the procedures were experimental, ineffective, or
unsafe.177 Beyond this case, such an argument is questionable since sex assignment surgeries for
infants are so safe that even states have elected to force the surgeries upon young infants. 178
Counter to WDHS’s argument, even those who make the appeal decisions found the provision
lacking.179 Those persons “acknowledg[ed] that gender-conforming hormone and surgical

See Flack v. Wis. Dep’t. of Health Servs., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1003 (W.D. Wis. 2019).
Id. at 1014-15.
173 Id. at 1019.
174 See id. at 1020-22
175 Id. at 1003.
176 Id. at 1008
177 See Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
178 Such an argument is questionable given that there are examples that exist, such as in M.C. ex rel. Crawford v.
Amrheim, 598 Fed.Appx. 143 (4th Cir.2015). where intersex infants do not choose to have surgery. The adults ma ke
the choice. In M.C., a family was to adopt the infant. Before the adoption, M.C. remained in custody of the State of
South Carolina. During that time, state actors decided M.C. needed to have gender reassignment surgery. The state
actors and the doctors performed the procedure to make M.C. “male.” Ironically, the state chose M.C.’s sex through
a surgery that in other contexts, such as the views of the Wisconsin Department of Health, are unsafe and
experimental. Just five years later, the South Carolina legislature is currently considering a bill called the Youth
Gender Reassignment Prevention Act, which subjects health care professionals to the threat of license revocation to
practice. H.R. 4716, 123d Sess. (S.C. 2020). Among the provisions of this act —in addition to the suppression of
treatments such as surgeries and puberty blocking hormones—the proposed legislation also prevents “interventions
to align the patient’s appearance or physical body with the patient’s gender identity” and “interventions to alleviate
symptoms of clinically significant distress resulting from gender dysphoria.” Id. The bill ends the surgical part of
transition, but medical professionals may not advise those with gender dysphoria to dress in conformity with their
identified gender. Id. This bill may also prevent treatment for depression as it relates to gender dysphoria. Id.
Conflictingly, the bill allows mental health counseling. Id. Drug therapies are plausibly “interventions to alleviate
symptoms.” Id.
179 Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
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treatments for gender dysphoria can be medically necessary and that the [current exclusion]
conflicts with current medical practice.”180 The same surgeries and medications were covered to
treat other conditions,181 including the use of hormones.182
The court regarded WDHS’s arguments that the ACA antidiscrimination provisions do
not apply in this case as “nonsense;” those arguments do not need examination.183 However, the
court dwelled on whether WDHS had the power under the Medicaid Act to exclude such services
as medically unnecessary using an argument based on Fifth Circuit law that experimental
procedures could be medically unnecessary.184 The court decided that this is an antiquated ruling
from 1980 and that the medical profession “has reached a formal consensus as to the safety and
efficacy of surgical treatments for severe gender dysphoria.” 185 The court concluded that “the
state’s adoption, or at least continued enforcement, of the Challenged Exclusion is unreasonable
as a matter of law and not entitled to deference.”186 The court barely addressed the Equal
Protection issue other than to say that both parties agreed that heightened scrutiny applied , and
there was no apparent benefit to public health from the exclusion. 187
While Flack does not address most of the issues with completeness as the arguments of
the opposing side were lacking, there are at least two critical takeaways from this case. First, the
parties here both acknowledged that transgender persons are a quasi-suspect class and, therefore,
any analysis under the Equal Protection Clause would warrant heightened scrutiny. Second is the
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Cf. Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties, 29 Harv. J.L.
& Gender 51, 60-62 (2006) (discussing that such procedures for the intersex, and particularly infants, are routine and
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182 Flack, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 1009-10.
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184 Id. at 1015
185 Id. at 1015-16 (citing Lankford v, Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a state has discretion
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notion that an insurer should cover a service or procedure if it is non-experimental, safe,
effective, and recognized as the proper standard of care. This case from Wisconsin moves the
needle as to where the law needs to go to ensure proper protections for transgender persons in
receiving the care they need, should they opt for that care. To continue to deny these transition
therapies to a wide range of community members is not only a tragedy; such denial is unethical.
3. Battleground: Iowa
Iowa’s provisions of coverage for transition services through Medicaid is a political war.
In March 2019, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the state’s previously stated exclusion of
transgender health coverage was a violation of the state’s civil rights law and, thus, illegal. 188 In
this case, the Iowa legislature had amended the Iowa Civil Rights Act to add “gender identity” to
protected characteristics.189 The Iowa Supreme Court determined whether or not that language of
the prohibition of surgical procedures related to “gender identity disorders” was a violation of the
statute or the Iowa Constitution.190 The defending agency argued that all Medicaid beneficiaries
in Iowa were not entitled to gender-affirming surgical procedures because they are performed
primarily for psychological issues.191 The court held the opposite. The plan denied coverage
because they were for the purpose related to gender identity, which would be a violation of the
Iowa Civil Rights Act.192 The Iowa Supreme Court did not discuss the constitutional issue
because the statute banned discrimination.193
The legislature did not surrender in response to this decision. Just two months later the
governor signed a bill into law that allows Medicaid and other state-funded health care providers

Good v. Iowa Dep’t. of Human Servs., 924 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa 2019).
Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 862. The court notes that this is only because the surgeries are related to transsexualism. There are surgeries
performed for other psychological reasons that the Medicaid plan covers.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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to exclude transgender-related care.194 This gap leaves the possibility of even gender-affirming
care, let alone hormones or surgery, in doubt for citizens in Iowa.195 While Iowa law continues to
protect civil rights for transgender persons in some ways (most notably, housing and
advertising), the law specifically excludes transgender persons from receiving surgery.196 It
specifically provides that “This section shall not require any state or local government unit or
tax-supported district to provide for sex reassignment surgery or any other cosmetic,
reconstructive, or plastic surgery procedure related to transsexualism, hermaphroditism, gender
identity disorder or body dysmorphic disorder.”197
Such language is a blatant, direct, and overt act to exclude this quasi-suspect class from
potential violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Transgender persons are a
quasi-suspect class because (1) transgender persons have been subject to a long history of
discrimination that continues to this day; (2) transgender status as a defining characteristic bears
no relation to perform or contribute to society (3) transgender status and gender identity have
been found to be obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics; and (4) transgender
people are unarguably a politically vulnerable minority. 198 While this view is thus far in the
minority, it is gaining some momentum. Circumstances like those in Iowa illustrate the need for
the judicial adoption of an expanded definition of sex to provide protections to transgender
persons as already exist for cisgender persons. The change in judicial interpretation would also
stop the war in states like Wisconsin and Iowa. There is no reason that a state should have the
power to target and exclude a specific procedure based on a person’s gender identity.
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Discussed below are the problems requiring resolution to move the needle toward
adequate protections for transgender persons in their health coverage; their resolution would
enable transgender persons to have access to the care that they need. Whether these human
beings decide they want to transition, are transitioning, or are looking to take another step in that
process, they deserve and are entitled to medical treatment that is necessary to enable them to
live as they truly are.
Part V: Legal Transitions and Changes
While the situation for transgender persons may seem bleak, there exist some simple yet
difficult changes necessary for the law to protect this population and guarantee them the essential
services they need. This part examines those necessitated changes in two subsections. The first
explores legislative and regulatory ways to offer protections to transgender persons through
neutralizing the “medically necessary.” The second discusses judicial transformation and better
interpretations of the definition of sex than the weak reasoning found in Franciscan Alliance.
1. Transforming “Not Medically Necessary” into “Totally Medically Necessary”
As shown above, insurers can discriminate with too much ease. The problem stems from
insurers looking out for their bottom line or relying on age-old prejudices to keep transgender
persons from continuing their transition journey. Individuals, like Jasmine, find themselves
caught in unnavigable web of legal and bureaucratic hindrances to their needs and goals. The
systems presently permitted by the language of § 1557 as it currently stands enable
discrimination to perpetuate, whether covert—such as in the insurance appeals process—or
overt—as in explicit bans in Medicaid programs.
Recognition of transition services as medically necessary is critical. While data is not
obtainable at present, the other costs associated with lack of transition treatment, including
treatments for other conditions such as depression, should receive adequate consideration. The
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coverage of these services may reduce or eliminate added costs. There would also be a gain in
human value as treatment may provide a way to prevent persons from taking more drastic and
violent steps. As Jasmine recounted, she was consistently suicidal. There is a value to all human
life.
Categorizing transition services as an EHB would require coverage of services related to
transition. One might think EHBs include transition services and procedures already. One of the
main EHB categories is mental health of which coverage is required in all market-place based
plans.199 The same is true for Medicaid Plans.200 However, even some of the “model”
marketplace plans—even from liberal states like New Jersey—have many impediments to
transition services. Still, states like Wisconsin in Flack try to argue that “it has always been this
way.” Unfortunately for the Wisconsin Department of Health Services, times change to the point
where procedures are no longer experimental but standard, prescriptions such as hormone
therapies are standard treatments for other patients, and even the persons denying the claims
made by transgender persons do not understand why such care is not covered .201 Even though
gender dysphoria is a “mental health disorder,” transition services and procedures do not receive
the same coverage as other mental health services; coverage for gender dysphoria should receive
the same protections as other designated mental health conditions. A quick edit to the end of the
Mental Health essential benefit to add “including transition services” should suffice. 202
The fastest way to enable this transformation from a rigged system into one that allows
positive human experiences and growth is through legislation. Legislative action at the Federal
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level in the current political climate seems unlikely. However, advocacy at the local level for
change can be useful for many. New Jersey has a model statute for contracts for insurance
companies that offer health coverage—even though this statue relates to inmates' health care.203
This statute prevents insurers from “denying or limiting coverage, or denying a claim, for
services including but not limited to the following, due to a covered person's gender identity or
expression or for the reason that the covered person is a transgender person.”204 Such a statute, if
extended to all and not just inmates, would significantly knock down walls to treatment for
transgender persons seeking transition. Currently, nineteen states and The District of Columbia
have laws or mandates against blanket exclusions for gender-affirming treatment in benefits
packages.205
As a global example, Argentina is an effective model for the way legislation needs to
shift to enable effective and necessary transitions. In 2012, Argentina led the way in developing
the rights of transgender persons in ways that no nation before it had done. 206 With unanimous
Senate support, the law in Argentina now (1) allows a person to change their gender on official
documents without surgery or psychiatric diagnosis and (2) requires public and private medical
professionals “to provide free hormone therapy or gender reassignment surgery for those who
want it—including those under the age of 18.”207
With such legislative changes, “medically necessary” loses its teeth, and the complex
processes or specific exclusions no longer work. Such would be a boon for those seeking
transition services.
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2. Solidifying the Definition of Sex
The evolving definition of sex within Title IX could help save § 1557 if courts continue
to move in that direction. Franciscan Alliance held that under Title IX, the original language of
the statute that supplies the definition off sex, protections are limited to those who are
cisgender.208 However, the statute is almost fifty years old.209 Interpretation within a modern
context should be used adapt this out-of-date definition to a contemporary meaning. The law is a
living, breathing thing. One cannot consume oneself with “what it was in the past” while
ignoring the present or future. Society learns, grows, and adapts. That is not to say the law
should continuously shift as the country requires some consistency; however, that does not mean
that laws and interpretations are immutable. Even the Supreme Court has overturned itself
before, such as Brown v. Board of Education overturning Plessey v. Ferguson.210 The language
in Brown v. Board even acknowledges that new knowledge and “modern authority” change
meaning and interpretation of the law.211 Therefore, the definition of sex within the Title IX
context could change to match more contemporary meanings and interpretations. Changes to the
standard of medical care for transgender persons—as noted in Flack, which also recognizes the
scientific and social shifts212 —are comparable evidence to the psychological evidence in Brown
v. Board.213 Science and social change evolve meanings into contemporary ones. The judiciary
lives; the judiciary cannot remain in 1972 forever.
Several cases support this movement within the Title IX context. For example, in Grimm
v. Gloucester County School Board, the judge held that claims of discrimination based on
transgender status were per se actionable under Title IX, which warranted the claim to be
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reviewed via intermediate scrutiny.214 Such holdings have several possible ramifications, all of
which should occur under the law.215 First, gender identity would be a protected class under the
category of sex, as listed as Title IX. Second, as a result of that categorization, § 1557 would
inherit “transgender” as a protected class; however, prospective plaintiffs such as Franciscan
Alliance Inc. would highlight that the court in Franciscan Alliance already stated the original
definition controls. The issue is one of interpretation, and whether as the ties change statutes can
take on new meanings. While not necessarily statutory, Brown v. Board provides a framework
for this. In Brown v. Board psychological impacts on the “separate but equal” policy swayed the
Court’s reasoning to change how the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment. 216 Here, a
similar concept could apply. The definition of sex could change depending on new ways of
thought and thinking. The court in Flack recognized this fact, and the persons denying the
approval requests for transgender patients in Wisconsin realized that times change. Battles must
end; there must be movement forward.
Finally, those protections offered under the law subject any review to intermediate
scrutiny. Subjecting reviewed laws to intermediate scrutiny means that programs like Medicaid
would have to show that the policies were more than merely rationally related to the outcome.217
Here, there is no such relationship. There may be more monetary savings, should that be the
state’s logic, in providing coverage for transition services rather than ongoing and potentially
expensive mental health treatment. The movement to intermediate scrutiny would be a boon for
transgender persons. As Title IX would also adopt that definition, gender identity would become

214

Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Va. 2018).
For similar holdings, see also Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenisha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d
1034 (7th Cir. 2017); see also A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 408 F. Supp. 3d 536 (M.D. Pa. 2019); see also
Adams by and through Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty, Florida , 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2018); see
also Evancho v. Pine Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 267 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
216 See Brown v. Bd., 347 U.S. at 484-8.
217 U.S. v. Virginia , 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
215

35

Section 1557: A Tragedy of Discrimination in Five Parts
protected under § 1557, affording transgender persons all the protections they had before the
Franciscan Alliance injunction, including protections in marketplace plans.
Such guarantees within coverage would be a boon for transgender persons. People like
Jasmine, frustrated by their insurance company repeatedly, could receive their benefits without
having to try to navigate a complex system. Mental health issues that surround the population of
transgender persons in the United States would decrease. There is nothing but positive outcomes.
The definition of sex should encompass gender identity rather than being a mere “biological”
definition. Life is not that black and white.
Since 2010, various circuit courts have decided cases in favor of transgender persons218 in
the employment related context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964219 or on another
basis. While not mentioned in the ACA itself, there are potential ramifications and spillover of
the definition of sex from Title VII. A new definition of sex under Title VII would have
significant persuasive value to the interpretation of sex as it relates to Title IX and the ACA. If
Title IX’s definition of sex was to match the new definition of sex under Title VII, the ACA
would offer protections like those under the original final rule issued by HHS, which included
gender identity.
The Supreme Court has already heard arguments in a landmark case that could have
broad implications for the rights of transgender individuals beyond its Title VII question. On
April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
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Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al., to answer “[w]hether Title
VII prohibits discrimination against people based on (1) their status as transgender [and] (2) sex
stereotyping.”220 Oral arguments were heard on October 8, 2019,221 and the Court has not yet
rendered a decision. The answer to these questions has broad ramifications. Answering the first
question in the affirmative significantly alters the landscape for other civil rights provisions such
as Title IX. If yes, it is more than plausible that the same expansive protected status would
expand the definition of sex in Title VII. Should that happen, Title IX would offer protections for
transgender persons under the definition of sex. Expanding the definition of sex under Title IX
carries those same protections into the ACA and § 1557.222 The long tragedy would be over, as
protections would be offered to transgender persons and the services they require in all federally
funded programs including insurers offering market-place based plans and Medicaid. Not
medically necessary would transform into medically necessary, and persons like Jasmine would
not have to fight excruciating battles to get the services they need.
Epilogue
The problem facing transgender persons when battling discrimination is disheartening.
Ethically, the right thing to do—the just thing to do—is to move the needle in such a way to offer
protection to these individuals, whether child or adult, looking for surgery or not looking for
surgery. Something must change. The definition of sex must encompass gender identity. There
must be statutory protections, whether on a state or federal level. This tragedy cannot go on any
further. Transgender persons should have the chance to be who they are and receive the same
protections as cisgender persons under the law. The judiciary must reinterpret, or the legislature

Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018),
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Comm’n, 139 S.Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 18-107).
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220

37

Section 1557: A Tragedy of Discrimination in Five Parts
must rewrite; the battles must cease.
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